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Abstract 
 
This article reviews experimental evidence on the effects of policies intended to promote 
behavior by firms that is more socially responsible and less socially irresponsible. Corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) can provide firms with opportunities for profit, but changes are 
likely to increase total welfare only if firms adopt them freely and without taxpayer subsidies. 
Mandated CSR circumvents people’s own plans and preferences, distorts the allocation of 
resources, and increases the likelihood of irresponsible decisions. Evidence that government 
policies will increase welfare and a compelling argument that proven benefits justify reductions 
in freedom are necessary in order to justify CSR mandates. To date, this has apparently not 
been achieved. Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) is concerned with whether firms 
undertake harmful actions that managers would be unwilling to undertake acting for 
themselves, or that a reasonable person would expect to cause substantive net harm when all 
parties are considered. Markets in which stakeholders are free to make decisions in their own 
interests provide some protection against CSI. Tort and contract law provide additional 
protection. Nevertheless, managers sometimes act irresponsibly. Codes of ethics that require 
fair treatment of stakeholders while pursuing long-term profit reduce the risk of irresponsible 
decisions. Management support and stakeholder accounting are important for successful 
implementation. Firms may wish to consider these measures; many already have. 
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Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and Irresponsibility Policies 
 
1. Introduction 
     In economic theory, maximizing the present value of long-term profits is the objective of a 
firm. Some commentators suggest that this objective is insufficient because firms should also 
undertake what they regard as socially responsible activities. The concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) became prominent in the 1960s. Promoters wish to use firms as 
instruments for achieving various social objectives. In addition they are concerned with 
reducing corporate social irresponsibility (CSI).  
     Some advocates of CSR and of efforts to reduce CSI suggest that owners and managers lack 
incentives to make socially responsible decisions. As a consequence, the argument goes, 
corporate managers need guidance that will lead them to make responsible decisions. Guidance 
is likely to be insufficient, however, if following the guidance would harm profits. Therefore, 
government incentives and penalties may be required to ensure firms follow the guidance. 
     A contrasting view is that firms should be free to pursue the profit-making objectives of the 
owners. In doing so, firms need to develop mutually agreeable arrangements with 
stakeholders—those who have substantive economic interests in the activities of the firm. 
Stakeholders typically include owners, creditors, employees, suppliers, distributors, local 
communities, and customers. Prices and other arrangements adjust to reflect the preferences of 
individuals in each group. With each party free to end its relationships and each protective of its 
reputation, the system is self-monitoring and self-correcting.   
     The pursuit of long-term profits encourages firms to treat other parties well and to avoid 
misleading them. For example, firms tell customers about the limitations of their products in 
order to retain the benefits of good long-term relationships and to avoid the costs of dealing 
with disgruntled customers and with lawsuits. If managers treat owners poorly, the owners can 
find new managers. If firms treat other stakeholders poorly, the stakeholders can seek out firms 
that treat them better. Buyers seek products that best suit their needs. To do this, they can obtain 
independent information from others, search the Internet, use trusted suppliers, or buy well-
known brands. If buyers discover that they have been misled, they can punish the seller by not 
buying the product in the future, demanding a refund, discouraging others from making a 
purchase, posting comments on the Internet, or suing. Finally, there are long-standing legal 
remedies in both tort and contract law if stakeholders or others are harmed or might be harmed. 
These remedies include compensatory damages and injunctions. 
     One might reasonably ask whether regulators are as strongly and clearly motivated to do 
good, whether they possess the requisite knowledge to do so, and whether they can do so in 
practice?  Moreover, when a government policy is harmful, the harm is greater in extent than 
when a firm’s policy is harmful, there is not the same opportunity for those who are harmed to 
exit the relationship, and ambiguous feedback, interest group lobbying, and inertia are more 
likely to delay its reversal than would be the case for a firm. 
     Despite explanations by Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and others, 
the idea that people should be free to make contracts as they see fit (the so-called “invisible 
hand” of the market) is counter-intuitive for many people. They cannot believe such a system 
can work because it lacks a coordinator and, they argue, the parties are motivated by greed. 
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Adam Smith addressed this concern: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, 
or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith 
1776/2008, p. 25). In contrast, mandates and subsidies aimed at promoting CSR and reducing 
CSI are based on the belief that people need the guiding hand of government. 
 
2. CSR and CSI as Government Regulation 
     Regulators face a complex problem if they are to improve on the welfare outcomes that arise 
from free-market interactions. In order to do so, they must meet basic conditions to help ensure 
that regulation will make the situation better than market solutions. In particular, welfare is 
likely to be reduced by a CSR or CSI regulation if the regulator fails to meet any of the 
following common-sense conditions:  
1. Know stakeholder’s endowments, relationships, and preferences  
2. Describe in detail how the situation could be changed to the benefit of those affected  
3. Design rules that will produce the intended changes  
4. Design rules that will not produce unintended changes 
5. Resist pressures to modify the rules in ways that would reduce the total benefit 
6. Ensure those affected by the rules know and understand them 
7. Establish rewards and punishments to ensure the rules are followed 
8. Establish fair procedures for resolving disputes arising from enforcement of the rules 
9. Change rules (see 1–8) when the situation changes, as with inventions or scarcities 
10. Keep the administrative costs of the rules below the value of the benefits. 
 
Learning how many existing regulations meet these ten conditions would be interesting: The 
answer should already be known. In the case of the first condition, for example, stakeholders 
themselves do not know their preferences until faced with specific choices. Consider the case 
of a consumer buying a product. Nisbett and Wilson’s review of the literature on making 
decisions concludes, “the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any 
introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable 
reports” (1977, p. 233). Customers know what they like, even if they are not sure why. But how 
could a regulator know their preferences? The question was raised by Jeremy Bentham in the 
late-1700s, “It is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too little of himself. Be it so: 
but is it so certain that the legislator must know more? It is plain, that of individuals the 
legislator can know nothing: concerning those points of conduct which depend upon the 
particular circumstances of each individual, it is plain, therefore, that he can determine nothing 
to advantage” (Bentham 1789, 1823, p. 379, 1789/1907).  
     And might the ability to choose for oneself add to one’s enjoyment of life? A study of data 
from 46 nations leads to the conclusion that choice is important to happiness (Veenhoven, 
2000). Moreover, regulation dulls the connection between the preferences of buyers and 
sellers’ production decisions and innovations.  
     Rizzo and Whitman (2009) ask a similar question to the one asked in this article, in their 
case about new paternalist or so-called libertarian paternalist policies. Do policymakers know 
enough to improve the situation? They propose that government policy makers must pass six 
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knowledge tests in order to be confident of improving welfare. They conclude that success is 
unlikely. 
     Regulation is a forecasting problem. Legislators, regulators, and courts appear to depend on 
expert judgment to forecast whether a proposed regulation will lead to desired outcomes. The 
question that then arises is, are such forecasts valid? An early review of the experimental 
evidence on forecasting for complex and uncertain situations concluded that experts with 
accurate information are unable to make predictions that are better than those made by non-
experts (Armstrong 1980). That conclusion was reinforced by a study of more than 82,000 
judgmental forecasts made over 20 years by 284 experts in politics and economics 
(Tetlock, 2005). The experts’ unaided forecasts were little more accurate than those made 
by non-experts, and they were less accurate than forecasts from simple models. Despite 
the evidence, most people believe that they and their favorite experts are exceptions. The 
disconnection between evidence and belief about expert forecasting is described by the Seer-
sucker Theory: “No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay 
for the existence of seers” (Armstrong, 1980). 
     Despite the widespread belief that regulation is useful, the authors were unable to find 
scientific studies that established that regulation was superior to non-regulation in any specific 
case. To the contrary, the effects are typically harmful (e.g., Winston, 2006). For example, 
mandated disclosure and disclaimer regulations, which are intended to provide potential buyers 
and other stakeholders with important information, are examples of regulations that seem 
obviously beneficial. U.S. courts have upheld such restrictions on free speech for nearly seven 
decades on the basis of their intuitive appeal: how can more information be harmful? Would 
not people be protected by guidance and warnings? In light of these commonsense beliefs, it is 
remarkable that all experimental evidence has shown that buyers and sellers have been harmed 
by mandated disclosures (Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2011; Winston, 2008). The same applies 
to mandated disclaimers (Green and Armstrong, 2012).  
     Opinions of experts tend to lag decades behind the evidence, and the opinions of the general 
public tend to lag those of the experts. In the early 1900s, economists and the general public 
saw a need for regulation of businesses. This viewpoint persisted in university economics 
textbooks. For example, Paul Samuelson’s Economics advocated central planning. By his 13th 
edition (1989) Samuelson claimed, “The Soviet economy is proof to the contrary to what many 
skeptics had earlier believed, a socialist command economy can function and even thrive” 
(quoted in Skousen 1997, p. 148). However, as Winston (1993) documents, empirical evidence 
on the failures of regulation began to affect economists’ views on regulations. By the late 
1970s, for example, 97% of economists agreed that “tariffs and import quotas reduce general 
economic welfare” and 90% agreed that, “a minimum wage increases unemployment among 
young and unskilled workers” (Kearl, Pope, Whiting and Wimmer, 1979, p. 30). For a 
summary of the state of economic knowledge of minimum wage policies, see Gorman (2008). 
Judging by government policies around the world, public opinion and political leadership have 
yet to catch up with evidence on these issues.    
     An appeal to the economic concept of externalities is another way the argument is made for 
government intervention. Externalities occur when there are benefits or costs to third parties 
that are not reflected in the price of a product. As a consequence, the theory goes, such products 
are under or over produced relative to the socially optimal quantity. In practice, third parties 
typically propose that a particular externality exists, and that government action is needed in 
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order for the market to provide the correct quantity of the product. This argument is another 
way of saying that sellers and buyers are not being sufficiently socially responsible, or are 
being socially irresponsible. Alternatively, sellers or buyers sometimes lobby for a subsidy, 
arguing that this would lead to greater social responsibility as a result of more of a socially 
desirable product being produced and consumed. Given that there is no agreement of what 
social responsibility is or how much it is worth relative other desiderata—nor is it plausible that 
free people would agree—it is not clear how any government or political process could 
determine the optimal quantity of the product. Because firms are guided by prices in their 
search for profits, they have stronger incentives and better means than do regulators to provide 
the optimal social quantity of a product: the quantity and kind for which buyers and other 
stakeholders are willing and able to pay for with their own money.  
     The belief that regulation is desirable persists despite the lack of experimental evidence to 
support regulation. Indeed, natural experiments whereby heavily regulated countries such as 
North Korea are comparable with less regulated countries that were previously similar, such as 
South Korea, provide scant evidence of superior social outcomes. South Korea’s 2012 Index of 
Economic Freedom is 69.9 and its 2010 per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power is 
$28,600. The equivalent figures for North Korea are 1.0 and $1,100 (Miller, Holmes, Feulner, 
et al., 2012). For further evidence from natural experiments, see the statistics provided on 
Wikipedia in the entry titled “Eastern Bloc economies.” 
     Government regulations are expected to harm stakeholders because they ignore prices and 
restrict the rights of consenting adults to make contracts with one another. Might it be fair to 
suggest, then, that accepting government subsidies and exploiting protective regulations are 
examples of corporate social irresponsibility? The findings of a study of the deregulation of 
nine U.S. industries (including airlines, railroads, brokerage, telecommunications, and natural 
gas) were consistent with economists’ predictions that consumers would benefit. The general 
public expected the opposite outcome for some industries, such as airlines. Even after de-
regulation, the general public perceives that airline customers were harmed (Winston, 1993). 
De Soto (1989) shows how government regulations lead to socially irresponsible results in 
poorer countries.     
     The authors’ review of the evidence on government regulation supports the Iron Law of 
Regulation: “There is no form of market failure, however egregious, which is not 
eventually made worse by the political interventions intended to fix it” (original source 
unknown). 
 
3. CSR and CSI Regulations in Practice  
     Because agreeing on a definition of CSR is hard, if not impossible, firms may be told or 
forced to take actions that seem socially responsible to some people, but which are regarded as 
socially irresponsible by others. For example, should managers of corporations divert money 
from stockholders to charities of their own choosing without the agreement of all of the 
owners? Should managers support social causes that are objectionable to many of the firm’s 
stakeholders? Should firms be forced to discriminate on the basis of race and gender in their 
hiring and promotion decisions? Should managers support programs that the firm’s owners 
expect will harm welfare? For example, according to a National Center for Public Policy 
Research 2012 press release, at their annual shareholder meeting in Chicago executives from 
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Target Corporation refused to answer stockholder requests for cost-benefit information on the 
various environmental sustainability programs listed in the corporation’s 2011 Corporate 
Responsibility Report (Target Corporation 2012). 
     Major disagreements over what constitutes socially responsible behavior are common. 
Discrimination based on race, sex, or ethnicity is believed by many to be responsible behavior 
and is endorsed and sometimes enforced by governments. Since the early 1960s, the U.S. 
government has supported present-day discrimination to redress historical disadvantages. For 
example, elite universities discriminate against Asians and southern white males under the 
name of affirmative action. To have the same opportunity for acceptance at America’s elite 
colleges, Asians must score 450 points higher out of 1600 on the SAT tests than people with 
dark skin (Espenshade and Radford, 2009, p. 92). It is not immediately obvious how this 
helps to redress previous disadvantages. Moreover, the majority of people in the U.S. do not 
support such discrimination. A May 26-June 2009 Quinnipiac University nationwide survey of 
3,097 registered voters asked “Do you think affirmative action programs that give preferences 
to blacks and other minorities in hiring, promotions and college admissions should be 
continued, or do you think these affirmative action programs should be abolished?” Their 
responses were: Continued 36%; Abolished 55%; Unsure 9%. 
     When the government imposes policies in the name of social responsibility, they tend to 
persist for long periods. This is partly because the costs tend to be dispersed and the benefits 
concentrated. In contrast, participants in free markets are punished if their idea of what is 
socially responsible fails to provide a net benefit. For example, a manager might consider the 
skin tone of a potential employee an important consideration for modeling a range of clothes to 
the advantage of the firm and its customers. If a manager were to adopt an “affirmative action” 
policy that led the firm to hire a web designer based on skin color, on the other hand, this would 
put them at a disadvantage to firms that did not discriminate in this way. Firms in South Africa 
were leaders in rejecting racial policies: they openly disobeyed apartheid laws. Managers 
regarded those actions as good for their firms. 
     Some proponents of CSR argue that firms will ultimately earn higher profits if they do good 
deeds. Without an agreed-upon and unambiguous definition of CSR, however, such claims 
cannot be tested. Even if a testable general claim were forthcoming, other variables—including 
subsidies, tax breaks, and special treatment—and causal ambiguity would require experiments 
for proper testing (Armstrong, 2012). Furthermore, investment returns are contingent on 
circumstances and must be evaluated each on its own merits.  
     Despite the questionable value of analyzing non-experimental data, many researchers have 
published such analyses to assess the value of CSR. Margolis and Walsh (2003) list 127 such 
papers published between 1972 and 2002. About half (50.5 percent) of the 109 studies that 
treated corporate social performance as an independent variable failed to find a positive 
relationship with financial performance. In their review, they found that the 13 previous 
reviewers since 1978 had identified “problems of all kinds in this research… sampling 
problems, concerns about reliability and validity… omission of controls… and [of] moderating 
conditions” (p. 278). No doubt the number of similar studies has grown substantially since the 
Margolis and Walsh review.  
     Where corporate social responsibility decisions conflict with the market by asking or forcing 
managers to obey rules that are harmful for their firms, CSR is likely to lead to socially 
irresponsible decisions in the form of penalties imposed on people who have done no harm and 
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in the form of distortions in the allocation of resources. Moreover, governments forcing firms 
to allocate resources in particular ways, for example in response to the lobbying of the 
sustainability movement, amounts to a confiscation of property rights. 
 
4. CSR and CSI as Voluntary Policies 
     Firms might adopt policies in order to encourage their employees to act responsibly and to 
avoid acting irresponsibly. These practices are informed by the stakeholder theory of the firm. 
For an excellent review of the history and literature on the stakeholder theory, see Donaldson 
and Preston’s (1995), one of the most frequently cited academic papers on social responsibility. 
They approach the problem by looking at whether firms use the stakeholder theory (many do), 
the normative issue (is the stakeholder theory justified on moral grounds?), and the 
instrumental issue (are firms more profitable if they follow stakeholder theory?). They 
conclude that there is a lack of evidence on the instrumental value of stakeholder theory. Partly, 
they write, this lack of evidence is due to the lack of explicit descriptions in the use of the 
stakeholder theory.  
     One view of stakeholder theory is that it requires a change in the objectives of the firm. 
Instead of simply maximizing the net present value (NPV) of profits, the stakeholder-theory 
objective of the firm is to maximize NPV subject to treating other stakeholders fairly. This 
view is consistent with Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) argument that the property rights of 
stakeholders provide the moral justification for using stakeholder theory as the basis of the 
management of firms. It is also consistent with beliefs held by managers; for example, in 
Baumhart’s (1968) survey of subscribers to the Harvard Business Review, 83% of the 
respondents agreed that, “for corporation executives to act in the interests of shareholders 
alone… is unethical”.  However, to be effective, a firm’s objectives must be explicit and 
measurable. Support for this conclusion is drawn from hundreds of lab and field experiments 
on objective setting (Locke and Latham, 2002). 
 
5. Evidence on Voluntary CSR  
     The authors conducted searches for experimental and quasi-experimental research findings 
that could provide evidence on the effects of voluntary corporate social responsibility and 
corporate social irresponsibility initiatives. Searches included the Internet and examining 
references in key papers. The authors attempted to contact all those whose findings they had 
referred to in order to ask whether they had accurately summarized the findings, and to ask 
whether evidence had been overlooked. They received replies from most of those they had 
attempted to contact and made extensive changes in response to the replies. 
     Many firms have responded to CSR in a rational way by looking for profit opportunities. 
For example, if people are willing to pay three times as much for eggs laid by “free-range” 
chickens, it may be possible for the seller to increase profits. Customers who buy them are 
happier even if they have little idea of what it means for chickens to be raised free-range, if 
there is no objective difference in the taste of the eggs, or health effects, and if there is no 
knowledge about the happiness of the chickens. The key is that decisions do not lead to net 
harm. Hence, a firm may find opportunities to increase profits by satisfying customers who 
hold strong beliefs on the lifestyles of chickens. 
8	  	  
     Causes might help advertisers establish a link with customers who might otherwise resist 
their appeals. Causes can be of a general nature, such as donations to charities, or firms can 
show how purchasing the product contributes to a social good. An advertisement can inform 
people that the firm is aligned with a popular cause, such as “This ad was printed on recycled 
bio-degradable paper.” To show their support for causes, sellers use phrases such as “Fair trade 
certified,” “Fairly traded,” “Certifiably sustainable,” and “Local.” The terms sometimes 
indicate support by a third party, such as “Rainforest Alliance Certified.”   
     Causes can be tied to purchases. In 1983, in what is reputed to be one of the earliest 
examples of tying sales to charitable donations, American Express advertised that they would 
donate a penny to the renovation of the Statue of Liberty for each use of its credit card. 
Compared with the same period in the prior year, it claimed a 28 percent increase in credit card 
usage, a huge increase for such a small offer. For a description on how to use causes to improve 
profits, see Armstrong (2010, pp. 140–141). 
     Sainsbury’s, the British supermarket chain, sold “fair trade” bananas at four times the price 
of conventional bananas (Stecklow and White, 2004). In an experimental study of coffee-
buying behavior, the price of cups of coffee advertised as “fair trade” and the price of cups of 
the top selling variety were varied with discounts, which were advertised. Nearly 500 buyers 
were observed and interviewed. Demand for the fair trade variety was much less sensitive to 
price changes (Arnot, Boxall, and Cash, 2006). The Fair Trade approach should not be 
regarded as a CSR panacea, however. While it does some good and little harm as a niche brand, 
the anti-free trade approach of its promoters would be harmful if it became more prevalent 
(Mohan, 2010). 
     Surveys found that 83 percent of U.S. respondents would have a more positive image of a 
firm if it supported a cause that they respect. And 86 percent of U.K. respondents said they 
would be more likely to purchase from a company associated with a cause (Ellen, Mohr, and 
Webb, 2000).  
     In summary, it is possible for stakeholders to gain from applications of the CSR concept 
without harming others if the initiatives are voluntary and are not subsidized by taxpayers. 
Failing this, there are strong a priori reasons to expect that actions taken in the name of CSR 
will be socially irresponsible, as defined in the next section. This conclusion is not new.  
 
6. Evidence on Methods to Reduce CSI 
     This paper uses a definition that Armstrong (1977) proposes: “A decision can be considered 
as irresponsible if it is (1) inferior to other options when all effects upon all parties are 
considered, or (2) a decision that the decision maker would consider unethical in a personal 
capacity.” 
     Corporate social irresponsibility is a long-standing problem. In a survey of 1,800 subscribers 
to the Harvard Business Review, 82 percent of the respondents indicated that their industries 
were likely to have engaged in “unethical practices.” The primary influence in making these 
unethical decisions was reported to be the behavior of the respondent’s boss (Baumhart 1968).  
     One source of social irresponsibility is that people working for firms might employ unethical 
procedures to increase their personal wealth at the expense of the firm (e.g., embezzlement). 
Owners of firms endeavor to exclude such behavior because it harms profitability. The 
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penalties for irresponsible actions by corporate managers can be huge (Karpoff and Lott, 1993; 
Lott, 1992). A related problem occurs when managers or boards of directors deceive the 
owners. Here again the penalties are high. A study of 585 firms that were targeted by the SEC 
for financial misrepresentations from 1978–2002 found that while legal actions led to legal 
penalties of around $24 million, the reputational losses were more than seven times larger 
(Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008). 
     Perhaps the major source of irresponsible behavior in firms is people following the dictates 
of their roles even when doing so causes harm. This issue of people following instructions in 
contravention of their own ethical beliefs was examined in Milgram’s (1974) “blind obedience” 
studies on learning. It was unsurprising that he found that people submit to authority. What was 
surprising was the size of the effect. Many “teacher” subjects in Milgram’s experiments on 
learning continued to administer electric shocks to their “learner” subjects even though they 
thought their actions as a teacher were leading the learner to suffer considerable pain and, in 
some cases, death. In another experiment, subjects were given the role of either lawyer for the 
plaintiff or lawyer for the defendant in a dispute over damages arising from an automobile 
accident (Babcock et. al 1995). The subjects then read the evidence on the case and were asked 
to estimate what dollar amount a fair judge would award in damages. The two groups of 
“lawyers” found different parts aspects the evidence important and the difference between the 
estimates of fair damages were large. Such biased estimates would not be in the interest of 
clients, as they would reduce the chances of an out-of-court settlement. 
     The studies suggest that one way to help reduce the chances that managers will make 
irresponsible decisions is to give them roles that are consistent with responsible behavior. 
Developing explicit and measurable objectives should help firms to achieve this. For example, 
“The role of our managers is to maximize long-term profits subject to the fair treatment of our 
stakeholders. To that end, managers are expected to report on the effects of the firm’s actions 
on stakeholders in addition to the usual financial reporting requirements.”   
     While codes of ethics have long been suggested as a way to reduce irresponsible corporate 
behavior, many codes are neither clear nor operational. A laboratory experiment by Brief, et al. 
(1996) found that a code of ethics for financial reporting failed to reduce a high rate of 
fraudulent accounting because it was vague. Also, it did not involve an attempt to change the 
roles of the participants. Codes might be effective if they reinforce the role of long-term profit 
making subject to satisfactory treatment of the other stakeholders and if they are supported with 
stakeholder accounting. Nothing further should be added, as this would cause confusion.  
     Some experimentation has been done to assess the effectiveness of changing the roles of 
managers. Armstrong (1977) conducted an extension of the Milgram experiment by using an 
actual case faced by Upjohn, a pharmaceutical company. The company was facing the potential 
ban of one of its drugs, Panalba, by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). After much 
study, a scientific panel concluded unanimously that the drug had serious side effects that led to 
unnecessary deaths. The benefits of Panalba were available from other drugs that did not cause 
fatalities. The Upjohn board of directors decided to use available legal means to delay a ban 
and to continue selling Panalba. This description was drawn from Mintz (1969). 
     In the original experiments, participants played the role of one of seven Upjohn board 
members. After receiving background information on the case, the role players were asked to 
choose from one of five responses to the potential banning of the drug by the FDA. The five 
10	  	  
possible responses ranged from immediately removing the drug from the market to taking steps 
to keep the drug on the market.  
     Thirty-three faculty members conducted this experiment with 319 groups of subjects 
from ten countries between 1972 and 1977. The 57 control groups received no information 
on responsibilities. None of the control groups decided to remove Panalba from the market and 
79 percent took the same action as Upjohn: “Continue efforts to most effectively market 
Panalba and take legal, political, and other necessary actions to prevent the authorities from 
banning Panalba.” This decision was classified as irresponsible by 97 percent of a convenience 
sample of 71 respondents similar to the subjects who had participated in the experiments. 
Interestingly, subjects in the control group were bothered by their decisions, as had occurred in 
the Milgram experiments, yet in the follow-up questionnaire 90% of the subjects were unaware 
that the experiment dealt with irresponsible behavior.   
     Because roles exert powerful influences on decision-making, a treatment was devised as an 
attempt to modify subjects’ perceptions of their roles so that they would feel responsible to all 
of the firm’s stakeholders. To that end, some subjects were told that Upjohn’s board had passed 
a stakeholder-role resolution in 1950 stating,  
The Board’s duty was to recognize the interests of each and every one of its 
‘interest groups’ or ‘stakeholders’. The stakeholders are those groups that make 
specific contributions to the firm. Thus, the board is to consider the effects of 
decisions upon employees, creditors, stockholders, customers, suppliers, 
distributors and the local community. Furthermore, the board should consider 
only its own stakeholders in making decisions. It shall not attempt to serve the 
common good or society in general. (All of the current board members are well 
aware of this policy statement.)  
    In another treatment designed to further emphasize the stakeholder role, the above 
description was provided to a Board that was comprised of three representatives of 
stockholders and one representative each of the local community, suppliers, consumers, and 
employees (stakeholders). The stakeholder roles were provided to the subjects before they read 
the materials, so that they would read the materials in-role. 
     The effects of the two stakeholder treatments were modest. This was expected due to the 
fact that profit was the only criterion measured. Decision-makers pay little attention to 
unmeasured criteria (see, e.g., Slovic and MacPhillamy, 1974). To reinforce the stakeholder 
roles, another experimental treatment was introduced, this time with “stakeholder accounting.” 
The subjects received information on the impact of the decisions upon stockholders, 
employees, and customers. Under the stakeholder accounting treatment, the percentage of 
highly irresponsible decisions was reduced to 23 percent when the participants were told that 
the Board agreed with the stakeholder role for directors, and to 22 percent when the Board was 
composed of stakeholder representatives. The socially responsible decisions went from none 
under the control condition to 12 percent when the board adopted the stakeholder view to 29 
percent when the board was composed of stakeholder representatives (Armstrong, 1977). 
     In an extension of the Panalba experiment by King et al. (2010), subjects first considered the 
situation and reported the decision they would make as private individuals. They were then 
assigned to stockholder roles. The proportion of socially irresponsible decisions by 
stockholders was lower when they had made the individual out-of-role decision first. 
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Computer, rather than face-to-face, interactions also reduced the proportion of socially 
irresponsible decisions, presumably by reducing group pressure to conform to traditional roles.  
     A widely studied quasi-experiment on stakeholder management of companies has been 
going on since 1956. It involves more than 250 companies employing almost 100,000 people in 
the Mondragon cooperative in Spain. Employees own the firm, although not all employees are 
owners. The board of directors represents all stakeholders. Statistical analyses by industrial 
economists conclude that these cooperatives perform well in comparison to other Spanish 
companies that produce similar goods (Arando et al. 2010).  
     International welding business Lincoln Electric promotes the stakeholder role in the firm’s 
Code of Conduct. The 52-page code includes a non-retaliation policy in order to encourage 
reporting of ethical issues, and the firm provides Compliance Hotlines in 24 countries and an 
Internet page for reporting. The code includes the following questions for employees: 
     Question Three: How would it be perceived? 
     This question brings into focus the consequences of your decision for both you and 
for Lincoln. It is worth asking: How will this decision affect my reputation and that of 
the Company? How would I feel about my decision if it were reported on the front 
page of the newspaper? Would I be comfortable if my family and friends knew I made 
this decision?  
     Question Four: Is it fair to all stakeholders? 
     Ethical decision-making demands that you take into account the effects of your 
decision on customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders and the wider community. It 
is important to widen your ethical lens and think about whether the situation or action is 
consistent with our ethical commitments and if it is fair for everyone concerned. Who 
has an interest at stake in the situation, and how significant is it compared to others? 
Who will be helped or hurt by your decision? (Lincoln Electric 2009, p.7–8.) 
     Other successful companies, such as BB&T, Southwest Airlines, WalMart, and Whole 
Foods Corporation, base their conduct on stakeholder theory as well.  
 
7. Conclusions 
     No agreed definition of corporate social responsibility exists, and such agreement may be 
impossible to achieve.  Social responsibility to some people is irresponsible to others. Views on 
what is socially responsible change over time. It is not enough that some people think today 
that some firms should behave in ways that they regard as more socially responsible. It is 
necessary to provide evidence that proposed changes would increase welfare in practice, and to 
provide a compelling argument that proven benefits justify any reduction in freedom. To date, 
this appears not to have been done. Actions promoted as socially responsible that are forced or 
subsidized suppress the free expression of the needs and concerns of buyers and the efforts of 
sellers to satisfy them. Suppression of free market activity tends to reduce the total welfare of 
society. With economic theory, experimental evidence, and individuals’ preference for freedom 
of choice all against government regulation, there is no obvious need for further research on 
regulation in the name of social responsibility. 
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     Voluntary CSR initiatives, on the other hand, can increase welfare. When buyers and sellers 
are free to make their own decisions, the CSR movement can help firms identify opportunities 
for increasing profits by providing benefits to customer and other stakeholders. Many firms 
recognize the marketing opportunities associated with CSR. Experimental research might help 
to choose CSR initiatives that would be effective for firms and their stakeholders.  
     Corporate social irresponsibility occurs when a manager makes a decision that is either (1) 
unethical in terms of a manager’s personal values, or (2) inferior to other options when 
considering the effects upon all parties. Avoiding such decisions will likely be consistent with 
the values of most owners and with their objective of long-term profit maximization. As a 
consequence, owners and their mangers are likely to welcome methods that can help them to 
prevent social irresponsibility.  
     Based on experimental research to date, one method that could help to prevent 
irresponsibility is to change the roles of firms’ managers in such a way that they strive to 
maximize long-term profitability subject to fair treatment of their stakeholders. Stakeholder 
accounting and management support seem important for the success of such initiatives. 
Descriptions of socially responsible roles could be used as the basis of a firm’s code of ethics. 
While there is a need for more experimental studies to learn about the costs and benefits of 
these proposals for reducing corporate social irresponsibility, many firms have already 
implemented some of these proposals with apparent success.  
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